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GOALS FOR MATHEMATICS EDUCATION

1.
To give the educated person a fund of mathematical analogies
and the ability to use them.
2.
To enable the educated person to further create mathematical
analogies for his own use when needed.
3.
To enable the educated person to understand how and to what
effect mathematical analogies have been used significantly for
our civilization and our culture.
4.

To enable the educated person to intelligently anticipate

directions, areas, ways in which mathematical analogies, new or
old, might have further significant effect for our civilization

and our culture.

The latter two are [expression of Peter Hilton's dictum, that we
should Nstrive to awaken in as many people as possible,
irrespective of their chosen vocation, an awareness of the nature
of our science, and its significance for our civilization,
material and spiritual. M
The lanalogies' mentioned in 1 through 4 above need not be
applications in the traditional sense; they may often have more
to do with the relationships between ideas than with sensed
reality; they may in fact be pure mathematics.
Jack V. Wales, Jr.
The Thacher School
Ojai, Cal iforni a
8/29/88

MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATION
Jack V. Wales , Jr .

·.
MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATION

When mathematics is taught using lots of applications and the
applicability of mathematics is emphasized <pe r haps to the point
of becoming the guide and justification of mathematics
education), students are likely to come to believe that the
mathematics is win- the worldly circumstances which are the focus
of the application at hand. Such a belief does not encourage the
investigation of the limitations of the application of
mathematics to the situation. Further, it is ground for coming
to see worldly reality as a mathematical edifice which must be
conquered, and oneself as feeble before it. It would be better
to teach that mathematics is the study of an independent, extant
reality; and that any application of mathematics is the
postUlating of an analogy between a set of worldly circumstances
and a set of mathematical circumstances. Then the coincidence of
pattern is a cause for delight, and the limitations are expected,
even if they are not seen.

I wish here to argue that we mathematics teachers should not
feel that it is necessary to justify whatever mathematics we
teach by its applicability, and further that even the most
applicable mathematics should be presented as being worthy of
study independent of its applicability, not least because its
application will be done best when its independence is accepted.
By 'application' I mean not only the use of mathematical patterns
to increase control or predictive power in practical situations,
but also the use of mathematical patterns to increase
understanding in practical or impractical or even fantastical
situations.
When I was learning to fly, my instructors told me, MThe
throttle controls your altitude, the elevator controls your
speed, not the other way around. M I now believe that is a
distortion, but it was a very useful one. When one begins flying
an airplane, he has a natural tendency to believe that the
throttle controls the airplane's speed and the elevator makes the
plane go up or down. In fact, the situation is much more
complicated than that: and my instructors' dictum was
instrumental in my learning to use the two controls effectively.
I would use it today if I were to take the controls of an
airplane again.
I don't think the phenomenon of an idea being of good effect
even if it is a distortion is a partiCUlarly unusual one.
Another example might be the dictum, MThere is no important
difference between men and women. M Or, ·When acting in a play by
Shakespeare, one should never give emphasis to a personal
1

pronoun.~
If those sentences are not true, acting as if they
were might nevertheless have good effects because they counteract
some deeply ingrained erroneous biases.

The idea I want to offer here is, I suspect, correct . Even
if it is not, however, acting as if it were would have good
effects. And so I want to present the idea here, examine some of
its consequences, and defend that complex consisting of the idea
and its consequences.
The idea is this: first, that mathematics is an account of
an extant reality that is independent of physical reality or
social reality; and second, that it is therefore appropriate to
understand applications of mathematics in various arenas as
analogies, analogies which often appear as metaphors.
I don't know, nor do I care, just what philosophical
position I am taking when I say that mathematics is an account of
an extant reality. The important point is that mathematical
truth is independent of human judgment. 29 is prime. 27 is not
prime. Those sentences are true not because I or any expert says
50, but because 29 La prime and 27 is ~ prime.
That is just
the way they are. I don't know offhand whether forty-three times
sixty-seven is equal to fifty-one times sixty-one, but there is
no doubt that it either is or it isn't, independent of anything
anyone does or says. Mathematical truth is about the least
contingent truth around. Mathematical reality is there to be
discovered or observed.
At the same time, mathematics gives an account of logical
inevitability, not physical inevitability. ~There is one
thing ••• of which a geometry is ~ a picture, and •.• that is the
so-called real world,· says the famous mathematician, G. H.
Hardy. (1) No one can mathematically prove that the sun will
rise tomorrow or that it won't, that the stone will fall when
released, that closing the circuit will cause the light bulb to
come on, or whatever: physical reality may more or less coincide
with mathematical pattern, but it is not constrained by it. This
fact gives substance to the word 'unreasonable' in the title of
Eugene Wigner 1s essay, ·The Unreasonable Effectiveness of
Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.
(2)
N

What, then, is the relationship between mathematics and,
say, physics? Is mathematics a language in which physics is
expressed, as is suggested by the title of Tobias Dantzig's book,
Number; The Language of Science ? ()
If I am right that
mathematics is an account of an extant reality, then it is
certainly more than a language. Perhaps mathematical symbolism
is a language, but the mathematical ideas, the mathematical
facts, expressed by the symbols are not mere language. Rather,
physics is a science which, among o t he r things, makes analogies
2

between mathematical circumstances and physical circumstances .
If extent of spatial separation is like number, and this
particular spatial separation has an extent which we take to be
like the number 5, then that one has an extent which is like the
number 7, and furthermore, the two of them together constitute a
spatial separation the extent of which is like the number 12.
This is not a particularly unusual idea; mathematicians and
scientists often refer to mathematical Mmodels· of worldly
circumstances, by which they don't mean anything too different
from what I mean when I use the word 'analogy.'
Why, then, do I choose to use that somewhat unusual word?
Because the word 'analogyl tends to remind us of certain things
that the word 'model' does not. The important points are these:
any analogy has two parts or sides, and the extent of validity of
an analogy is always in question. (Note Wendell Berry's words,
quoted later in this pa pe r , I

There are, roughly speaking, two kinds of analogy: explicit
and implicit, simile and metaphor. The literary critic Northrop
Frye obse rves,
In descriptive writing you have to be careful of
associative language. You'll find that [simile], or
likeness to something else, is very tricky to handle in
description, because the differences are as important
as the resemblances. As for metaphor, where you're
really saying Mthis ~ that,M you're turning your back
on logic and reason completely, because logically two
things can never be the same thing and still remain
two things •••• The motive for metaphor, according to
Wallace Stevens, is a desire to associate, and finally
to identify, the human mind with what goes on outside
it, because the only genUine joy you can have is in
those rare moments when you feel that although we may
know in part, as Paul says, we are also a part of what
we know. (4)
If application of mathematics is the making of analogies,
then in much of human knOWledge, mathematics is (ironically, for
if mathematics is not logical, then nothing is) not a simile but
a metaphor, in fact an unconcious metaphor, a culturally
subconcious metaphor, for other sorts of reality.
Digression
The words left out by the ellipsis in the quote by Northrop
Frye are,
The poet, however, uses these two crude, primitive,
archaic forms of thought in the most unhibited way,
because his job is not to describe nature, but to show
3

you a world completely absorbed and possessed by the
human minde So he produces what Baudelaire called a
~suggestive magic including at the same time object and
sUbject, the world outside the artist and the artist
himself." (5)
And when Frye mentions Wallace Stevens, he is referring to the
following poem by Stevens:
The Motive for Metaphor
You like it under the trees in autumn,
Because everything is half dead.
The wind moves like a cripple among the leaves
And repeats words without meaning.
In the same way, you were happy in spring,
With the half colors of quarter-things,
The slightly brighter sky, the melting clouds,
The single bird, the obscure moon-The obscure moon lighting an obscure world
Of things that Would never be quite expressed,
Where you yourself were never quite yourself
And did not want nor have to be,
Desiring the exhilarations of changes:
The motive for metaphor, shrinking from
The weight of primary noon,
The ABC of being,
The rUddy temper, the hammer
Of red and blue, the hard sound-Steel against intimation--the sharp flash,
The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant x.
Frye's contrast between ~describing nature~ and ~showing a world
possessed by the human mind,~ and Stevens's use of technical
symbols (A B C, X, weight, primary noon, temper, steel) for what
is shrunk from when one is motivated to metaphor, suggest that I
am off base, that the whole point of what they are talking about
is the contrast between poetry on the one hand and the
·objective- worlds described by math and science on the othere
But remember that Stevens's title is -The Motive for Metaphor.~
Is not science an (in some ways quite successful) attempt by the
human mind to absorb and possess a world?
It is one of the ironies of Man's present condition that a
motive of identification should have been a driVing force behind
what seems to so many to be the SOurce of so much alienation,
i.e., the application of mathematics to worldly circumstances.
4

As I put the fin i shing t ouches on this essay, I am starting t o
read a new boo k by the philosopher William Barrett, in whi ch I
f ound this:
We note th e e xt r a or d i na r y power and constructivity of
the human mind in producing the great edifice of modern
science. And y e t , precisely here occurs one of the
supreme ironies of modern history: The structure that
mo s t emphatically ex hibits the power of mind
nev e r t hel e s s leads t o the denigration of the human
mind. The success of the physical science s leads t o
t he at ti tu de of scienti fic ma te r i a l i sm, according t o
whic h the mind becomes, i n one way or an other, me r ely
t he pas s i ve pl ayt hing of ma t e r i a l f orces. The
of f s pr i ng turns aga inst its parent . We f orget what we
s hould hav e learned from Kant : that the i mprint of mind
i s ev e r ywhe r e on the body of this science, and without
the founding power of mind it would not exist.
The irony here is not one that we can merely sit
back and enjoy aesthetically. This doubt of the mind,
in its -actual consequences, in the lives of individuals
and societies, provides one of th e ordeals that modern
c i vilization wi l l have t o go through. (6)
Return
Frye suggests earl ier in his essay that as science moves from
data towards l aw s, i t M
moves toward i magination,M it tends to
invo ke ma t hema t i c s , which, along with lit erature and music, is
( he say s ) a language of the i magination. MA highly de vel oped
science and a highly developed art are very close together,
psychologically and otherwise. M (7) Pursuit of mathematics is the
pur sui t of understanding. (He nr y Pollack has said that the
essence of science is the right to repeat an experiment, while
t he essence of mathematics is the right to under stand.(8»
Surely understanding is, in Fr ye's terms, the identification of
the human mind with something outside it, the attribution of
meaning to the coincidence of pattern. In the case of
a pplications of mathematics, meaning is often attributed to the
co i nc ide nce of mathematical patterns with patterns of worldly
c i r c ums t ance s. Carried along by th e logical inev itability of
ma t hema t i cs , undaunted by Obs cur i t i e s in the coincidence of the
patterns, users of mathematical applications can come to believe
that the mathematics is "in" the worldly circumstances. (9)
Understanding becomes Mknowledge,M
Digression
Scott Buchanan gives a more thorough account of this in his
book Poetry and Ma themati cs. Here are some relevant excerpts:
MBel i ef is the natural attitude of a thwarted mind.
5

It

arises from fatigue and confusi on • ••• For the most part
confusion is of two sorts, one invol ving symbols, and
the other metaphysical nostalgia, the tendency of
thought toward the absol ute .·

(l0)

For Buchanan, symbols are things (aesthetic obj ect s) which point
to ideas (i nt el l e ct ual objects). He explains the confusion
involving symbols as follows :
The aest hetic properties of ceremony, for mula, natural
pr ocesses are intimations of comple x and profound
intellectual objects, but the difficulties of
intellectual cl a r i f i c a t i on and discriminati on leave t he
mind in va r ious attitudes of belief. For every
intelle ctual object, half-comprehended, there is an
aesth etic obj ect before which we bow in more or less
deep reverence. Pure aesthetic contemplation and
complete intellectual clarity are seldom found in human
beings, and any middle ground is touched with credulity
a nd idolatry. (11)

As to the metaphysical nostalgia,
[a stage of ma t hema t i ca l discovery] results when we can
see the rel ati ons holdi ng between Qualities ••••
Mathematical functions find elementary values in
qualities . Qualities find their relations in the
functi on s of ma th ema t i cs . Whenever this happens, a
system is recogniz ed, and it takes on a quasiindependence and reality. Often the effect on the
thinker is a conv iction. Belief attaches itself only
to such sys tems . The further e xpa n si on s and the wider
assumptions are ignored and there is a resting point
for thought in a mathematico-poetic allegory. (12)
Of co urse, we are dealing here not with a disorder or
aberration in human thought processes, but with the very nature
of thought itself . Buchanan's account has some similarities with
this desc r i pt ion by Ernst Cassir er:
[For the religious genius,] the power of his belief
first prove s itself in being made pUblic. He must
communicate his belief to others, he must fill them
with his own religious passion and fervor, in order to
be certain of his belief. This is possible only by
mean s of religious constructs--constructs which begin
as sy mbols and end as dogmas. Thus, even here, ev ery
initial ex pr e s s i on of feeling is already the beginning
of an alienation. It is the destiny and , in a sense,
t he i mmanent tragedy of every s pi r i t ua l for m that it
can ne ver overcome this inner tension ; to extinguish it
is to extinguish the life of the spir it. For the life
6

of the spirit consists is this very act of severing
what is whole in order that what has been severed may
be even more securely united. (13)
And, in Cassirer1 s view, this pattern runs deep.
t al ki ng about the same e xampl e , he says,
And s o it is that here, too, we find
os ci l l a t i on which sets in within all
a s they begin to take shape[,] ••• the
irresistible rhythm of life itself.

Lat er, but

the same
forms of c ultur e
ceaseless and
( 14)

Return
and that knowled ge is passed from one human being to another,
of t e n as subject matter in academic courses .
And s o we can see
how math emati cal c i r c ums t a nce s , which are intrinsi call y l ogical,
be come illogically (but perhaps mo re or less appr opriately)
i dentified with t hings they are not, namely worldly .
circumst ances.
Mathematics i s often a tremendously effective metaphor,
"unr ea sona bl y effective," in Eugene Wigner 1s words . But there is
danger here. Essayist Wendell Berry, in his volume on culture
and agriCUlture in the United States, refers in passing to
• •• the model of the scientists and planners: ••• an
exclusive, narrowly defi ne d ideal which affects
destructi vel y whatever it doe s not include. (15)
J oseph Weizenbaum, a computer scientist and teacher of computer
science, speaks this message t o h is fell ow computer science
teachers:
I .•. affirm that the computer i s a powerful new metaphor
f or helping us to understand ma ny aspects of the world,
but that it enslaves the mind that has no other
met aphors and few other r e sources to callan. The
wo r l d i s many things, an d no s ingle framework is large
e nough to contain them all, neither that of man's
science nor that of his poetry, ne ither that of
calculating reason nor t hat of pur e intuition. And
just as love of music does not suffice to enable one to
play the violin--one must al so master the craft of the
instrument and of music itself--so is it not enough to
love humanity in order t o help it survive. The
t eacher's calling to t each h is craft is therefore an
honorabl e one . But he must do mo r e than that : he mus t
teach mor e t han one me t a pho r , a nd he mus t teach more by
the example of his conduct t ha n by what he write s on
t he blackboard. He mus t te ach t he limitations of his
tools as well a s their pow er. ( 1 6)
7

Mathematics is{ like the computer, a powerful metaphor. Unlike
the computer, 1t is not a new metaphor. Any metaphor can take on
excessive significance in a human imagination. Perhaps because
mathematics is not a new metaphor, we are inured to it a bit; but
that may just mean that we have lost the nervous uncertainty that
comes with venturing into new territory, but not seen enough
failure of the metaphor to undermine our credulity. Metaphor is
a wonderful thing, not at all to be scorned. Even if it were not
wonderful, it would probably be inevitable. (17) The motive for
metaphor is a glorious aspect of human nature. G. Spencer-Brown
observes, ~That mathematics, in common with other art forms, can
lead us beyond ordinary existence, and can show us something of
the structure in which all creation hangs together, is no new
idea.· (18) But we need not take away from the value of the
metaphor, or from the metaphorical experience, indeed we will
enhance them, if we keep in mind the question, ·What are the
limits of this metaphor?·
If the application of mathematics is the construction of
analogy, whether simile or metaphor; and if we are to effectively
understand the limits of the analogy; then we must have some
understanding of each of the two things being compared, and that
understanding must be wider than what is immediately relevant to
the analogy. Hearing Macbeth say of Duncan,
After life1s fitful fever he sleeps well,

(19)

we bring to bear all our experience of life, fever, sleep, and
death; and if we did not know enough of sleep and death, of life
and fever, to know many ways in which they are not alike, as well
as ways in which they are, then the metaphors would not be as
rich and effective, the sentence not as beautiful, as they are.
Of course, at the same time, analogies broaden our experience,
deepen our understanding, give us new insights into the things
being compared; indeed, that is their very function.
What does all this mean for the teaching and learning of
mathematics? It means we should teach and learn mathematics
beyond that which is ·relevant,~ that which appears explicitly in
applications of practical importance. The perennial students'
question, ·When will we ever use this?- is a misguided question,
one to which we should not succumb. That is not to say that we
should refuse to answer it; but we should deny that the question
is determinative of what is important in a person's stUdy of
mathematics. Mathematics is one side of a myriad of important
analogies; if we are to understand that side, then we must
understand, we must teach and learn, mathematics itself. (And,
of course, the study of mathematics itself has its own rewards,
quite apart from applicability. Alfred North Whitehead describes
the pursuit of mathematics as "a divine madness of the human
spirit, a refuge from the goading urgency of contingent
happenings.· (20) Hardy says, "Real mathematics ••• must be
8

justified as art i f it can be justified at all. M (21) Scott
Buchanan obs e rve s , -The s tructures with which mathematics de als
are more like l ace, the l eaves of trees, and the pl ay of light
and s hadow o n a meadow or a human face, than th ey are like
buildings and machines, the least of their representati ves.·
( 22»
Knowled ge of calculus has vocational value for engi neer s
and others, but its value is increased by deep understanding of
the mathemati c al theory of calculus; knowledge of statistics is
per ha ps ne cessary for informed citizenship ; knowledge of
arithmetic ha s s urvi val v al ue : knowledge of number t he o ry may
hav e none of these, but it str engthens one's understandi ng of
ma t hema ti c s as an i nd ependen t reality which is in some of it s
facets anal ogous t o some face ts of o the r kinds of reality. ( 23)
I t a l so mean s t hat we s houl d resist, and t each our students
to r esist, an y t endency t o neglect t hose aspects of other s o r ts
of reality tha t do not fit into those analogies with ma t hemat i c a l
reality that we call applications. We should in fact loo k f or
them. We should seek to understand the limitations of our
analogi es, and we will understand them better if we know what i s
beyond them, on both sides. We will be the richer for knowing
what of mathematical reality does not fit the physical
circumstances, and what of physical reality does not fit the
ma t hema ti ca l c ircumstances, of whatever mathematical application
we are deal ing with .
We should, in short, let mathematics be, just as other
disciplines are, the pursuit of ways of seeing, the pursuit of
v i s i ons . We should teach our students to look for mathematical
analogies, to delight in them when they f ind them, to stretch
them and test them and savor them, but not to be consumed by them
lest they, we, suffer the fate of all tragic heroes. (24) We
will lay the proper foundation if we teach them mathematics
itself, as inde pendent, extant reality, whose wapplications are
in fact analogies which often appear as metaphors.
W

Jack V. Wales, Jr.
The Thacher School
Oj ai , California
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